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COMMENT
The United States Claims Court: A Safe
"Harbor" from Government Regulation
of Privately Owned Wetlands
Patrick Kennedy
Efforts to protect wetlands under the Federal Clean
Water Act and State Environmental Laws have led to an
increasing number of actions in the U.S. Court of Claims
brought by landowners for just compensation due to a
taking of their property through governmental action.
Landowners have turned to the Court of Claims because
it is seen as a "safe harbor" from government regulation
in which their claims are more likely to prevail. This
comment examines Loveladies Harbor, the pivotal Court
of Claims case where a denial of a permit to fill a wet-
land was found to be a taking. The focus of this com-
ment is the conflict between individual property rights
and the public interest in wetlands conservation. The
author argues that courts should recognize and give
value to the public interest in the ecological and envi-
ronmental benefits of wetlands.
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I. Introduction
The Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution1
states: "no person shall be .. .deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor shall private prop-
erty be taken for public use, without just compensation."'2 The
final clause of this amendment, which requires compensation
for taking private property for public use, is entitled the tak-
ings clause and it is the portion of the Fifth Amendment
which provides the issues for this Note. The takings clause is
meant to protect a private landowner's property rights from
unwarranted intrusions by the government. It is meant to pre-
vent the government from "taking" a private citizen's prop-
erty without some legitimate purpose and without compensat-
ing the owner of the property for the loss. Of course this
simple explanation of the takings clause begs the question
which is the impetus of this paper, specifically: when does a
government action which affects private property constitute a
"taking" within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment.
This issue has been important in the area of land use and
environmental regulations. A Fifth Amendment takings claim
has been an especially popular argument for challenging wet-
lands regulations. It is this conflict between wetlands protec-
tion and the takings clause which this Note emphasizes. Par-
ticular attention is given to a claims court decision which
found in favor of a land developer in a takings claim against
the Army Corps of Engineers and the Environmental Protec-
tion Agency.
In Loveladies Harbor v. United States,4 the authority of
the Army Corps of Engineers ("the Corps") to regulate wet-
lands 5 conflicted with the takings clause of the United States
Constitution.6 The United States Claims Court held that the
1. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
2. Id.
3. U.S. CONST. amend. V, cl. 4.
4. 21 Cl. Ct. 153 (1990) [hereinafter Loveladies IV].
5. Clean Water Act (CWA) § 404, 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (1988). Section 404 of the
Clean Water Act is the statutory provision which gives authority to the Army Corps
of Engineers to regulate dredge and fill activity in wetlands. See infra note 76.
6. Loveladies IV, 21 Cl. Ct. at 161.
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Corps' denial of a section 404 dredge and fill permit under the
Clean Water Act (CWA)7 was a governmental taking of pri-
vate property which required just compensation. Prior to the
Loveladies Harbor decision, at least one other court previ-
ously found a section 404 permit denial to also be a taking."
However, in that case, the court's remedy required the Corps
to invalidate the denial and to allow the dredge and fill activ-
ity to occur." The remedy in Loveladies Harbor, unlike any
other previous case, required the government to pay just com-
pensation -- specifically $2,658,000.10 This decision is impor-
tant because it was the first of its kind in which a 404 permit
denial constituted a compensatory taking, and the claims
court's taking analysis is likely to affect future wetlands
regulation.
Part II of this Note will provide a synopsis of the Fifth
Amendment takings cases through 1990. This synopsis will il-
lustrate the development of takings jurisprudence in the Su-
preme Court as it relates to regulation of the Nation's pri-
vately owned wetlands. Part III will describe the procedural
history of the Loveladies Harbor controversy, and report the
court's three pronged analysis for takings claims. In order to
fully understand the claims court's reasoning, Part III will
also recount the claims court's 1988 opinions" dealing with
the preliminary cross-motions for summary judgment entered
7. CWA § 404, 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (1988).
8. 1902 Atlantic Ltd. v. Hudson, 574 F. Supp. 1381 (E.D. Va. 1983).
9. Id. at 1407. This is the first case which held a section 404 permit denial to be a
taking. However, this case is not important to the takings issue because the court also
found the permit denial to be arbitrary and capricious, and the court invalidated the
denial without ever deciding the issue of compensation. Id.
10. Loveladies IV, 21 Cl. Ct. at 161. Florida Rock Indus. v. United States, 21 Cl.
Ct. 161 (1990), was decided on the same day as Loveladies Harbor. This case also
held that a permit denial under section 404 of the Clean Water Act amounted to a
Fifth Amendment taking and ordered compensation to the property owner. See infra
notes 109, 125 and accompanying text. Florida Rock contains issues important to this
Note and will receive due consideration, but the facts and issues in Loveladies Har-
bor better represent the possible problems of the claims court's position on the regu-
lation of wetlands.
11. Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States, 15 Cl. Ct. 375 (1988) [hereinafter
Loveladies Ila]; Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States, 15 Cl. Ct. 381 (1988)
[hereinafter Loveladies IMib].
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by both parties in conjunction with the court's final opinions
rendered in July 1990.12 Finally, Part IV will critique the
court's analysis. This final part is meant to provide a general
framework which any court could work from in analyzing a
takings claim.
II. The Fifth Amendment Takings Issue
A. Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon: The Roots of Regulatory
Takings
Prior to 1922, a takings claim only occurred if the govern-
ment physically occupied the property in order to put it to a
legitimate public use. In 1922 the Supreme Court decided
Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon,13 where for the first time the
Court declared that regulating the use of private property,
without actual physical invasion, could constitute a taking of
that property." Pennsylvania Coal involved a Pennsylvania
state statute which required coal mining operations to leave a
certain amount of coal in the ground to provide support to
surface property. These pillars of coal were left intact to pre-
vent subsidence 5 of the surface property. The mining compa-
nies challenged the regulation as a violation of the Fifth
Amendment Takings Clause.'"
Justice Holmes wrote for the majority: "While property
may be regulated to a certain extent, if the regulation goes too
far it will be recognized as a taking. 1 7 In reaching his final
decision, Holmes balanced the public interest in preventing
subsidence of the surface property against the detriment to
12. Loveladies IV, 21 Cl. Ct. 153.
13. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
14. Id. at 414. This case established for the first time what is now termed a "reg-
ulatory taking." When a government entity regulates private property, severely re-
stricting the use of the property, the courts may find the government has effectively
"taken" the property from its owner without ever physically entering the property.
Id.
15. Subsidence is defined as the collapsing of the surface property above the
mine shafts due to lack of support from below. THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY
1213 (2d College ed. 1976).
16. Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 412.
17. Id. at 415.
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the coal mining companies' interest in utilizing the subsurface
property. 8 Holmes concluded that the economic loss to the
private interest of the coal miners out-weighed the public
benefit.19 The Court therefore invalidated the statute as un-
constitutional under the Fifth Amendment.
While the majority decision in Pennsylvania Coal has
had a significant influence on the formation of the present
takings doctrine, equally important is Justice Brandeis' fa-
mous dissent in the same case. Brandeis explained that the
Court should consider whether the government regulation
challenged in a takings claim is a regulation meant to prevent
a public harm or whether such regulation is meant to promote
a public benefit. 0 For example, if a regulation prevents a pub-
lic harm, such as the dumping of hazardous waste on property
in a populated area, then Brandeis concluded that such a reg-
ulation should be allowed to stand." A regulation of this type
is a valid exercise of the state's police power. However, if the
regulation is meant to promote a public good, such as building
a post office, then the Court should find that there has been a
taking.2" The public should pay for a government action which
18. In actuality, Holmes questioned the degree of protection to the public inter-
est. His opinion seemed to conclude that there was only a slight public interest to
balance against the private interest. Holmes believed the statute only protected a
number of individuals' private interests in preventing subsidence of the surface prop-
erty which these individuals owned. Id. at 413-14.
19. Id. at 416.
The heart of Holmes' decision is as follows:
Government hardly could go on if to some extent values incident to
property could not be diminished without paying for every such change in
the general law. As long recognized, some values are enjoyed under an im-
plied limitation and must yield to the police power. But obviously the im-
plied limitation must have its limits, or the contract and due process clauses
are gone. One fact for consideration in determining such limits is the extent
of the diminution [in value of the property]. When it reaches a certain mag-
nitude, in most if not all cases there must be an exercise of eminent domain
and compensation to sustain the act. So the question depends on the particu-
lar facts. The greatest weight is given to the judgment of the legislature, but
it always is open to interested parties to contend that the legislature has gone
beyond its constitutional power.
Id. at 413.
20. Id. at 417 (Brandeis, J. dissenting).
21. Id. at 417.
22. Id. at 417-18.
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provides benefits beyond what is necessary to protect the
health, safety and welfare of the general public.
In Brandeis' opinion, the Pennsylvania statute Was a stat-
ute that prevented a noxious use of property and therefore
prevented a public harm. Thus, he concluded the regulation
was a valid exercise of the police power and did not constitute
a taking.23
B. Modern Takings Cases
Both Justice Holmes' majority opinion and Brandeis' dis-
sent in Pennsylvania Coal have historical significance. The
concepts pronounced by each of these Justices have evolved
and been absorbed into modern takings analysis. The Holmes'
emphasis on economic impact is still a strong consideration,
but it rarely ever stands alone to find a-regulatory taking. The
harm/benefit analysis espoused by Brandeis has also made its
way into modern takings opinions as part of the majority rule.
However, it was not until sometime later that the Supreme
Court considered the regulatory takings issue again.
1. Penn Central
It was in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York
City,24 that the Supreme Court confronted the takings issue
for the first time in over fifty years. Penn Central involved a
plaintiff who wanted to sell the air space over its train station
to a buyer that wanted to construct a high-rise office building
above the station.25 Because the property had been designated
a "landmark," Penn Central Transportation Company applied
to the Landmark Preservation Commission for permission to
build an office building above the terminal. The Commission
denied the application for aesthetic reasons.2" The city's de-
nial effectively kept the plaintiff from selling the air-space
above the station. The plaintiff claimed this denial placed too
23. Id.
24. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
25. Id. at 116.
26. Id. at 117.
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severe of a burden on them and therefore constituted a
taking."
In deciding Penn Central, the Court considered some im-
portant concepts which have an important effect on wetlands
takings claims. One such concept was a three factor test the
Court developed for finding a regulatory taking. The first fac-
tor is the character of the government action. For example, a
physical invasion of property by government is more likely to
be found a taking than a regulation of the property which ad-
justs the "burdens of economic life to promote the public
good."' 28 The character of the government action is much more
intrusive on inherent property rights when there is an actual
physical occupation. The second factor recognized the impor-
tance of the economic impact of the government action on the
affected property owner.29 This factor considers how much
value will be lost in the property due to the government regu-
lation of its possible uses. If the diminution in value is exten-
sive enough, the government may be guilty of a taking. The
third factor considered the extent to which the government
action interfered with investment backed expectations." In
Penn Central's case the Court found that the city had a legiti-
mate interest in protecting the landmark, .and there was no
substantial loss to the plaintiff's investment.3 1 Penn Central
still had the use of its original investment - a train station.32
Besides the idea of a three factor test, the Court also dis-
cussed the important notion of what comprises the "parcel as
a whole."33 The "parcel as a whole" concept becomes impor-
tant if the property owner has in his possession extensive land
holdings, but the government is alleged to have interfered
with only one portion of these holdings. The court must de-
27. Id. at 119.
28. Id. at 124.
29. Id. at 125-28.
30. Id. at 125. For a more detailed look at the issue of investment-backed expec-
tations, see Lynn Ackerman, Comment: Searching for a Standard for Regulatory
Takings Based on Investment-Backed Expectations: A Survey of State Court Deci-
sions in the Vested Rights and Zoning Estoppel Areas, 36 EMORY L.J. 1219 (1987).
31. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 132-38.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 130.
1992]
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cide how much of the total property should be considered the
whole parcel for a takings determination. If the landowner
still has use of a significant portion of the property, even
though the government prevents use of other portions, the
Court will not find a taking." What constitutes the "parcel as
a whole" is important in wetlands regulation because often
only part of the original parcel will be wetlands subject to sec-
tion 404 dredge and fill permit requirements.
The weakness in this "parcel as a whole" concept is that
it does not offer a specific method of determining how much
of the total holdings should be considered.35 Should the court
consider past holdings which were recently disposed of, or
should it only consider that parcel which is specifically within
the controversy before the court? As will be noted later in this
paper, these become pivotal issues in the Loveladies Harbor
case.
2. Kaiser Aetna
One year after Penn Central, the Supreme Court heard
Kaiser Aetna v. United States,6 a landmark decision for wet-
land takings claims. The plaintiff in Kaiser Aetna constructed
a canal connecting its coastal pond with the open ocean in or-
der to establish private access to and from the ocean. The
Corps wanted to require the owner to allow public access to
the marina within the coastal pond.3 7 The Supreme Court
held that such a requirement interfered with an inherent
property right of the owner, specifically, the right to exclude
others. This was a vital property right which cannot be inter-
fered with by the government without just compensation."8
34. Id. at 130-31. Writing for the majority, Justice Brennan stated that takings
determinations "[do] not divide a single parcel into discrete segments and attempt to
determine whether rights in a particular segment have been abrogated." Id.
35. See Loveladies IIb, 15 Cl. Ct. at 391-93.
36. 444 U.S. 164 (1979). See 1 WILLIAM L. WANT, LAW OF WETLANDS REGULATION
§ 10.03 (1989)(looks at the effect of this decision).
37. Kaiser Aetna, 444 U.S. at 167-68.
38. Id. at 179-80. This case is cited as an example of a taking that has occurred
when a regulation abrogates the fundamental property right to exclude others. See
Loveladies IIb, 15 Cl. Ct. at 391.
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The significance of this decision to wetland takings jurispru-
dence is its effect on the navigable servitude.39 Prior to Kaiser
Aetna, the courts gave an excessive amount of deference to
the government's control over navigable waters and the right
of the public to have access to such waters.40 It is now appar-
ent that where owners have a right to exclude others from
navigable waters on their property, interference with their
right to exclude might constitute a compensatory taking.41 Be-
cause wetlands are within the definition of navigable waters
under the Clean Water Act,42 it would be a logical argument
for owners of wetland property that they have a right to com-
pensation when the government interferes with any of the
fundamental rights attached to that property.
3. Agins v. City of Tiburon
The next case of consequence to the wetland takings issue
is Agins v. City of Tiburon."' Agins provides a clear rendition
of the factors which courts should consider in basic takings
jurisprudence. First, courts should make sure the government
action advances a legitimate state interest.4" Secondly, courts
should determine if property owners in similar situations
share in the benefits and burdens of the regulation. This sec-
ond factor also requires the Court to consider the diminution
in value of the effected property.45 The third factor is the ef-
fect on investment-backed expectations. 6 The Agins holding
39. Navigational servitude is a doctrine which supports the idea of not paying
compensation when the federal government interferes with property rights incident
to riparian ownership. See: Martha G. Haber, Note, The Navigational Servitude and
the Fifth Amendment, 26 WAYNE L. REV. 1505 (1980)(navigational servitude is a
power invoked under the commerce clause used to protect the public right of naviga-
tion). For a brief explanation of the navigable servitude, see WANT, supra note 36, at
§ 10.03 [2].
40. See United States v. Twin Power, 350 U.S. 222, 227 (1956); United States v.
Chandler-Dunbar, 229 U.S. 53 (1913).
41. See WANT, supra note 36, at § 10.03 [3].
42. CWA § 502(7), 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7) (1988); 40 C.F.R. § 230.3(s) (1991).
43. 447 U.S. 255 (1980).
44. Id. at 260-62.
45. Id. at 262.
46. Id. at 262-63.
19921
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has been condensed into a two part test:"' application of a
government regulation to a particular piece of property is a
taking only if (1) the regulation does not substantially ad-
vance a legitimate state interest, or (2) the regulation denies
the owner the economically viable use of that property."8
The two part Agins test has become a permanent part of
the takings analysis. However, the courts still have not been
able to develop a strict rule for takings determinations. It has
been especially difficult to do develop concrete and uniform
rules because each takings claim involves a completely differ-
ent set of facts to which broad rules have been applied. 9
However, the Supreme Court, in the 1985-87 terms, decided
several cases which have helped to further establish the tak-
ings doctrine as applied in Loveladies Harbor.50
4. 1985-1987: Three Years of Significant Supreme Court
Takings Jurisprudence
From 1985 through 1987 the Supreme Court decided sev-
eral significant takings cases. The first of these cases opened
the door to finding that a permit denial under section 404 of
the CWA could be considered a taking. In United States v.
Riverside Bayview Homes,5 1 the plaintiff had begun to fill in
its wetland property when the Army Corps of Engineers filed
suit in the district court to enjoin such filling activity. The
district court found the property in question was within the
jurisdiction of the Corps, and held that the land owner's activ-
47. United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, 474 U.S. 121, 126 (1985).
48. Id.
49. See Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124
(1978).
50. Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987); and Keystone Bi-
tuminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictus, 480 U.S. 470 (1986). While these are important
cases, the specific facts and holdings are not pertinent to the issue of wetlands tak-
ings, the focus of this Note. See also John P. O'Connor, Jr., Casenote, Extortion
Loses a Synonym Thanks to Court Ordered Accountability in Land Use Exaction
Programs: Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, 107 S. Ct. 3141 (1987), 57 U. CIN.
L. REV. 397 (1988); and Susan J. Krueger, Comment, Keystone Bituminous Coal Asso-
ciation v. DeBenedictus: Toward Redefining Takings Law, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 877
(1989).
51. 474 U.S. 121, 124 (1985).
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ity was subject to the Corps' permit authority.52 The Court of
Appeals disagreed, stating that the jurisdiction of the Corps in
this matter should be narrowly construed to avoid a taking. 3
The Supreme Court reversed."'
The Supreme Court stated that a section 404 permit de-
nial in and of itself does not necessarily constitute a taking,
and if the situation were such that a taking does occur, the
Tucker Act5" allows for compensation. The Court would not
deny the Corps jurisdiction simply because exercising such ju-
risdiction may create a taking of private property. The signifi-
cance of this holding was the recognition that a section 404
permit denial could constitute a compensatory taking.5 7 When
this opinion is read in light of Kaiser Aetna's destruction of
the navigable servitude, 58 it is apparent that wetland taking
claims could be successful.
While Riverside Bayview hinted at allowing compensa-
tion for a regulatory taking, the Supreme Court's First Eng-
lish Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles59
decision settled the issue. It held for the first time that a tem-
porary regulatory taking may also be a compensatory taking.6
52. Id. at 125.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (1988). There is a presumption that this statute allows for
compensation for any taking .which occurs through application of a federal statute.
See Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1017 (1984).
56. Riverside Bayview Homes, 474 U.S. at 123-29.
57. Id. at 127. The Court stated: "Only when a permit is denied and the effect of
the denial is to prevent 'economically viable' use of the land in question can it be said
that a taking has occurred." Id.
58. See supra notes 36-42 and accompanying text.
59. 482 U.S. 304 (1987).
60. Id. at 304-05. While this case is not specifically cited by the Loveladies IV
court as its authority for requiring compensation for a regulatory taking, the Supreme
Court's decision-in First English settled any argument that such compensation would
be inappropriate for a regulatory taking. Therefore in Loveladies Harbor IV if a tak-
ing was found, compensation could be had. First English, however, is still an impor-
tant case to be aware of when considering the takings issue.
For more on this important Supreme Court decision, see Carlton E. Johnson,
First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles: Compensation
of Landowners for Temporary Regulatory Takings, 21 GA. L. REV. 1169 (1987); and
Alfred R. Gould, Jr., Note, First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of
Los Angeles: Compensation for Temporary Takings, 48 LA. L. REV. 947 (1988).
11
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In First English, the Court considered only a temporary regu-
latory taking by the local government, 6' nevertheless, the
Court's decision has been understood to apply to permanent
takings claims under section 404 regulation, at least with re-
gard to requiring compensation.2
Also decided during the 1985-1987 period was Connolly v.
Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp. 3 This opinion did not neces-
sarily consider facts or issues directly on point with a section
404 permit denial, but it did elaborate on the Agins three fac-
tor test.6 4 First the Connolly Court requires looking at the na-
ture of the government action. For example, was the action a
physical invasion or permanent in nature;65 or did the govern-
ment action interfere with property rights to adjust the bene-
fits and burdens of economic life for the promotion of the
common good?6 6 Secondly, the Connolly Court considered the
economic impact of the government action on the landowner:
does the government action require severe economic losses to
the landowner without any provisions to mitigate such
losses?6" Lastly the Court inquired into whether there has
been significant interference with investment-backed expecta-
tions.6 8 Such an inquiry determines whether the government
action unreasonably interferes with expected gains from an
investment.6 '
As the cases above show, while the takings analysis has
evolved a great deal since Pennsylvania Coal, there still re-
mains a considerable amount of grey area as to what are the
proper considerations in takings jurisprudence. The guidelines
61. 482 U.S. at 304-05.
62. See Michael C. Blumm & D. Bernard Zaleha, Federal Wetlands Protection
Under the Clean Water Act: Regulatory Ambivalence, Intergovernmental Tension,
and a Call for Reform, 60 U. OF COLO. L. REv. 695, 757 (1989) (the Supreme Court
may have ensured an increase in cases alleging takings due to section 404 permit
denials by approving money damages for temporary regulatory takings).
63. 475 U.S. 211 (1985).
64. Id. at 224-25.
65. Id. at 225.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 225-26.
68. Id. at 226.
69. Id. at 226-27.
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12https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol9/iss2/10
PRIVATELY OWNED WETLANDS
provided by the Supreme Court are so broad in scope that
they really do not give potential parties to a taking claim any
idea of what to expect from the courts which may hear the
claim. Loveladies Harbor is a claims court case which exem-
plifies how this lingering grey area can effect important issues
such as the preservation of our Nation's wetlands. The re-
mainder of this Note is dedicated to the Loveladies Harbor
decision and how the grey areas of the takings doctrine al-
lowed for a decision which appears to ignore the Nation's sen-
timent to preserve and protect our environment; an environ-
ment in which wetlands perform a vital function. The
Loveladies Harbor case should not be considered in isolation,
however. It should serve as an example of why more concrete
and specific rules regarding takings issues should be formu-
lated - especially when an important resource such as the
Nation's wetlands are the subject of the inquiry.
III. Procedural History of Loveladies Harbor
A. The Facts
In 1955, Loveladies Harbor, Inc., [hereinafter Plaintiff]
purchased 250 acres of undeveloped land for $300,000.7o Sig-
nificant portions of this land were wetlands." Plaintiff pro-
ceeded to develop 199 of the 250 acres before 1972, and
planned to develop the remaining fifty-one soon after. 2 How-
ever, by 1972, the federal Clean Water Act (CWA) 3 and the
New Jersey Wetlands Act 4 were passed. Both of these stat-
utes contained provisions for regulating the development of
wetland property. Because the remaining fifty-one acres of the
property were mostly wetlands, Plaintiff was required to com-
ply with both the CWA and the New Jersey law before devel-
oping the rest of the property.7 5 Both statutes compel a per-
70. Loveladies IIlb, 15 Cl. Ct. at 383.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Federal Water Pollution Control Act §§ 101-607, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387
(1988).
74. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 13:9A-1 to -10 (West 1990).
75. Loveladies Ilb, 15 Cl. Ct. at 383.
19921
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son who wishes to develop on wetlands to obtain a dredge and
fill permit from the appropriate federal 6 and state agencies."
In 1973, Plaintiff made concurrent applications to obtain
dredge and fill permits from both the Army Corps of Engi-
neers (the Corps) and the New Jersey Department of Envi-
ronmental Protection (NJDEP).78 Twice Plaintiff attempted
to acquire a permit from the NJDEP to fill the remaining
fifty-one acres, but the NJDEP denied both applications.7
Subsequently, Plaintiff sought an administrative appeal chal-
76. CWA § 404, 33 U.S.C. § 1334. Under section 404 of the CWA, the Corps is
the appropriate federal permitting agency. It is well settled law that the Corps has
broad jurisdiction to apply the CWA permitting requirements in order to preserve
and protect the Nation's wetlands. See United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes,
474 U.S. 121 (1985); Avoyelles Sportsmen's League v. Marsh, 715 F.2d 897 (5th Cir.
1983).
While the U.S. Attorney General announced that the EPA is the final authority
when construing section 404, 43 Op. Att'y Gen. 15 (1979), the Corps and the EPA
entered into a Memorandum of Agreement giving the Corps general authority to de-
termine jurisdictional wetlands. Section 404 gives the Corps the authority to issue
permits to dredge and fill such jurisdictional wetlands. CWA § 404, 33 U.S.C. § 1334.
Title 33 of the Code of Federal Regulations, Parts 320-328, outline the Corps' regula-
tions for implementing the permitting process. 33 C.F.R. §§ 320-328 (1991). Part
328.3(b) defines wetlands as: "those areas that are inundated or saturated by surface
or ground water at a frequency and duration sufficient to support, and that under
normal circumstances do support, a prevalence of vegetation typically adapted for life
in saturated soil conditions." 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(b).
The Corps' general procedure for permit applications is outlined in the regula-
tions. 33 C.F.R. § 325. The regulations also explain which types of discharges require
permits and which situations do not. 33 C.F.R. § 323.3, 323.4. The Corps considers
general policies when making a decision on a permit application, such as: the public
interest in the proposed projects, the effect on the wetlands, the possible detriment to
fish and wildlife, the effect on water quality, plus many other general considerations.
33 C.F.R. § 320.4.
See Andrew H. Ernst & Wade W. Herring II, Water, Water Everywhere, Better
Call the Corps: Section 404 Regulation of Wetlands, 41 MERCER L. REv. 843 (1990)
(giving a detailed explanation of the section 404 permitting process).
77. New Jersey's Wetland's Act of 1970 gives the state permitting authority to
the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection (NJDEP). N.J. STAT. ANN. §
13:9A-1. The authority of the NJDEP is not of concern for the purposes of this Note
and will not be discussed in any further detail. For a closer look at where this author-
ity comes from, see, Id. 13:9A-4(b) & (c).
78. Loveladies IHb, 15 Cl. Ct. at 384.
79. Loveladies Harbor IlIb, 15 Cl. Ct. at 384. The NJDEP denied the first per-
mit application without prejudice in 1973 because of insufficient information in the
application. The second application was denied on the merits in 1977. Id.
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lenging the validity of the denial,80 but before the appeal was
heard, the NJDEP extended a settlement offer to allow Plain-
tiff a dredge and fill permit for 12.5 acres instead of the fifty
acres.81 Plaintiff, however, rejected the offer and pursued the
appeal.2 The NJDEP administrator upheld the denial as
valid. Plaintiff then resubmitted an application for the 12.5
acres, and the NJDEP granted it. 3
Based on the NJDEP's first two permit application deni-
als, the Corps also rejected the first two applications Plaintiff
submitted for dredge and fill permits.8 " Plaintiff then submit-
ted a third application to the Corps to develop the same 12.5
acres for which the NJDEP approved a permit. Despite the
NJDEP's approval, the Corps denied this third application. 5
Loveladies initially challenged the validity of the Corps
denial, stating it was an arbitrary and capricious decision, but
the district court held the denial was valid. 8 Plaintiff then
filed a Fifth Amendment takings claim in the United States
Claims Court seeking compensation for the entire 12.5 acres
because the permit denial had rendered the entire property
useless for Plaintiff's purposes." This section discusses and
analyzes the Claims Court's opinion on this matter.
The first part of this section will examine the court's de-
lineation of what constitutes the "parcel as a whole." 8 The
80. In re Loveladies Harbor, Inc., 422 A.2d 107, 108, cert. den., 427 A.2d 588
(1981).
81. Loveladies IIlb, 15 Cl. Ct. at 384.
82. Id.
83. In 1981, the NJDEP accepted the plaintiff's application for a permit to
dredge and fill the 12.5 acres mentioned in the settlement offer. The NJDEP granted
the permit, even though it believed that Loveladies' proposed project failed to meet
the requirements of the New Jersey Wetlands Protection Act of 1970, because it felt
compelled to follow through with its previous settlement offer. Id. See Loveladies
Harbor v. Baldwin, 20 ERC 1897, 1898 (D.C.N.J. 1984)(quoting the NJDEP).
84. Loveladies IIlb, 15 Cl. Ct. at 384.
85. While the plaintiff's original application sought a permit to fill 12.5 acres, one
of the 12.5 acres was found to be uplands and not within the Corps jurisdiction. The
plaintiff modified the application to include only the 11.5 acres of wetlands, but the
Corps still denied the application. Id.
86. Loveladies Harbor v. Baldwin, 20 ERC at 1902.
87. Loveladies IIIb, 15 Cl. Ct. at 384.
88. Loveladies IIIb, 15 Cl. Ct. at 390-93.
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second section will report the court's handling of the first part
of the Agins test;89 this test is referred to by the Loveladies
court as the "substantial advancement test."90 The third and
final portion of this section addresses the heart of the court's
decision, the "economic viability test."'"
B. The Parcel as a Whole
"In deciding whether a particular governmental action
has affected a taking, [the Loveladies court] focuses on the..
. interference with the rights [of the property owner] in the
parcel as whole." '92 The government argued that the original
250 acres purchased in 1955 make up the whole parcel for the
takings decision.9 3 The Claims Court'did not accept this posi-
tion and concluded the whole parcel to be the 12.5 acres con-
sidered in the dredge and fill permit.9
The only binding precedent95 on the Claims Court was
Deltona v. United States.96 In Deltona, the developer alleged
a taking because of a section 404 permit denial.9 7 The Claims
Court decided that there was no taking because the developer
was able to use a substantial portion of the property in ques-
tion, notwithstanding the areas which were denied permits.9 8
89. See supra notes 43-50 and accompanying text. The first part of the test was
whether or not there is a legitimate government interest in the permit denial to Love-
ladies Harbor, Inc.
90. Loveladies IIb, 15 Cl. Ct. at 388-90.
91. Id. at 390-91.
92. Id. at 391. (quoting Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York, 434 U.S.
104, 130-31 (1978)); see supra notes 33-35 and accompanying text (discussing the
Penn Central antisegmentation rule).
93. Loveladies IIb, 15 Cl. Ct. at 392.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 388.
96. 657 F.2d 1184 (1981).
97. Id. at 1189.
98. Id. The plaintiff in Deltona originally purchased 10,000 acres in Southwest
Florida and divided the acreage into five sections. Before applying for a permit the
plaintiff had already filled in, developed, and sold two of the five sections. It was
seeking to fill and develop the remaining three sections. The Corps denied permits for
two of the three sections, leaving one section'and 111 acres of upland property availa-
ble to develop. The Deltona court was unimpressed by the plaintiff's claim that it had
already contracted to sell 90% of the two areas where permits were denied. Id. at
1188-89.
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In reaching its conclusion the Deltona court did compare the
total acreage from the original purchase to the amount of
acreage subject to the permit denials.99
However, the Loveladies court labeled this comparison as
the "first of 'a few statistics' "'00 considered by the Deltona
court. The court refused to accept "a rigid rule that the parcel
as a whole must include all [the] land originally owned by
[Loveladies Harbor]."'' 1 The Loveladies court determined
that the Deltona court's consideration of another statistic
which considered what was left to develop after the permit
denial was more significant.
After rejecting Deltona as helpful, the Claims Court cited
Keystone Bituminous Coal Assn. v. DeBenedictus'0 2 to aid in
the determination of what constitutes the whole parcel. In
Keystone Bituminous, the Court considered more than the
property subjected to the government regulation, but the
Court did not take into account the total property' 3 pur-
chased prior to the regulation. The Supreme Court looked to
"the value that remain[ed] in the property' when the taking is
said to have occurred."'1 4 The Loveladies court adopted the
same position." 5 By adopting this rule, the Claims Court ex-
cluded consideration of the entire 250 acres in the original
purchase. This left for consideration the fifty-one acres still in
Plaintiff's possession at the time of the alleged taking.10 6
The Loveladies court, however, quickly narrowed the
scope of the whole parcel to the 12.5 acres using the reasoning
from the Federal Circuit's opinion in Florida Rock. 107 The
99. Id. at 1192.
100. Loveladies IIb, 15 Cl. Ct. at 392.
101. Id.
102. 480 U.S. 470 (1987).
103. Id. at 497-506. The total property includes the entire property originally
purchased by the plaintiff in Keystone some seventy years before the plaintiff
brought the action. Id. at 505 n.32. The original purchase was actually series of
purchases in the early twentieth century. Id.
104. Loveladies IIIb, 15 Cl. Ct. at 392 (citing Keystone Bituminous, 480. U.S.
470).
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Florida Rock Indus. v. United States, 791 F.2d 893 (Fed.Cir. 1986). In Flor-
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Loveladies court found that 38.5 acres not considered in the
last application were already denied the necessary permits in
the previous two applications submitted by Plaintiff. 0 8 The
court decided it would be a fruitless effort to seek any further
permits: "there is no possibility one might put a pot of water
on the hot stove and have it freeze in this instance."10 9
C. The Substantial Advancement Test
The 1988 Claims Court briefly analyzed the Loveladies
Harbor facts under the first part of the Agins test;110 specifi-
cally, the court determined whether there was a substantial
advancement of a legitimate state interest."' In applying this
test to the facts of the case, the Loveladies court recognized
that the regulation involved in this matter '12 provided the
Corps with permitting authority in order to protect wetlands
and preserve the biological, chemical, and physical integrity of
ida Rock the plaintiff purchased 1560 acres of wetlands for the purpose of mining the
property for limestone. However, the Corps refused to consider a dredge and fill ap-
plication for more acreage than was necessary to supply the plaintiff with limestone
for more than three years. The plaintiff, therefore, submitted a permit application for
98 of the 1560 acres. The Corps determined that such mining operation would be too
detrimental to the wetlands and rejected the application. The Federal Circuit heard
the government's appeal from the lower court's ruling that there was a taking after
the permit denial. The Federal Circuit had to consider the issue as to what consti-
tutes the parcel as a whole. It concluded that because of the permit denial for the 98
acres, it was unlikely that the plaintiff would ever receive permission to dredge and
fill the remaining 1462 acres. It was therefore inappropriate to deem the entire 1560
acres as the whole parcel for the takings determination. Id.
The Loveladies court quotes the Federal Circuit's statement: "[the court does]
not think that the mere possibility one might put a pot of water on a hot stove and
have it freeze, is a reality requiring ... [the Court] to deem that viewing the entire
1560 acres .. .as a whole." Loveladies IIb, 15 Cl. Ct. at 393, (quoting Florida Rock
Industries v. United States, 791 F.2d 893, 904 (Fed.Cir. 1986)). In Loveladies Harbor,
both the state and the federal government had already stated that it would not allow
filling of the entire 51 acres. Based on the Florida Rock court's reasoning, the Lovela-
dies court determined that it was equally inappropriate to consider anything but the
12.5 acres in the permit application.
108. Loveladies IIIb, 15 Cl. Ct. at 393.
109. Id.
110. See supra notes 43.50 and accompanying text for a brief description of the
Agins test.
111. Loveladies HIlb, 15 Cl. Ct. at 388.
112. 33 C.F.R. §323 (1991).
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the nation's waters. " ' In light of this purpose, the court con-
cluded that the Corps sought to advance a legitimate state in-
terest with the permit denial.1
1 4
However, in order to complete the first part of the Agins
test, the Claims Court applied a harm/benefit analysis.18 This
involved a determination of whether the permit denial pre-
vented a public harm or promoted a public benefit."' It was
the court's belief that the permit denial promoted a public
benefit." 7 This made the rest of the Court's analysis very sim-
ple. The Court merely had to balance the interest in protect-
ing wetlands against the loss in value to the property." 8 In
striking this balance, the Claims Court disregarded as non-
binding, those cases which have concluded that the protection
of wetlands constitutes a prevention of harm which out-
weighs the damage to the-individual." 9 The Loveladies court
even went as far to set aside one of its own decisions where it
stated that the preservation of wetlands was a prevention of a
public harm. 2 ° The court instead turned to a decision handed
down from the Federal Circuit in Florida Rock Industries v.
United States.'2' The Florida Rock court had found that
preservation of the wetlands was merely for the public benefit
and the cost of such a benefit should be borne by the public
itself.12 The Loveladies Harbor court accepted this as the
binding general rule and, in balancing the benefits and bur-
113. Loveladies IIIb, 15 Cl. Ct. at 388.
114. The phrase "state interest" is meant to include the federal interest as well.
115. Loveladies IIlb, 15 Cl. Ct. at 388.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Smithwick v. Alexander, 17 ERC 2126 (E.D.N.C. 1982); American Dredging
Co. v. Department of Envtl. Protection, 391 A.2d 1265, 1270, aff'd, 404 A.2d 42 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1979); Just v. Marinette County, 201 N.W.2d 761, 767-68 (Wis.
1972)(the Wisconsin Supreme Court found that restricting the use of wetlands prop-
erty for recreational use was not to secure a public benefit, but rather it was to pre-
vent a public harm of changing the natural character of the property); see also Sibson
v. State, 336 A.2d 239 (N.H. 1975).
120. Loveladies Harbor., 15 Cl. Ct. at 388 (the court found Deltona to be no
longer binding after the Federal Circuit's decision in Florida Rock).
121. 791 F.2d 893 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
122. Id.
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dens caused by the permit denial, the court concluded that
the public should pay for that benefit.123
However, the Loveladies Harbor court did not want to
base its decision on this balancing test alone. It recognized the
problems with the harm/benefit distinction"" and decided
further analysis was necessary to solve the problem.
D. The Economic Viability Test
The economic viability test was the heart of the court's
decision in Loveladies IV as well as Loveladies IIIb. The
Loveladies IV court's basic consideration was whether there is
remaining commercial or economic use in the 12.5 acres after
the permit denial. The court's approach to this issue was to
consider the three factors from Connolly v. Pension Benefit
Guaranty Corp:12 5 "(1) 'the. character of the government ac-
tion'; (2) 'the economic impact of the regulation on the claim-
ant'; and (3) 'the extent to which the regulation has interfered
with distinct investment-backed expectations'." 2 ' While the
Loveladies Harbor court disposed of the first factor, the char-
acter of the government action, in its 1988 opinion, 12 7 the
court considered the second and third factors more closely in
its 1990 opinion.
The Loveladies IV court's analysis began with establish-
ing the value before the denial. 2 ' The court notes that the
valuations of property prior to the government action in an
eminent domain proceeding may reflect either the fair market
123. Loveladies Harbor, 15 Cl. Ct. at 388 (citing Florida Rock 791 F.2d 893 at
904) (when the Federal Circuit balanced the governmental interest in preserving the
wetlands against the loss of value to the landowner's property, the Federal Circuit
found that the balance fell in favor of the landowner).
124. The court stated that one man's prevention of harm is another man's pro-
motion of a benefit. The court also recognized that no court has ever determined a
taking based on the fact that a legitimate state interest was not found. Every decision
has had to include a discussion of the economically viable uses in the property before
and after the government action. Loveladies Harbor, 15 Cl. Ct. at 389-90.
125. 475 U.S. 211, 224-27. See supra notes 65-69 and accompanying text.
126. Loveladies Harbor Inc. v. United States, 21 Cl. Ct. 153, 155 (1990) (citing
Connolly, 475 U.S. 211, 224-25 (1986)(citations omitted)).
127. 15 Cl. Ct. at 391.
128. Loveladies IV, 21 Cl. Ct. at 156-57.
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value or some other value reflecting a use to which the prop-
erty may be readily converted.'2 9 Plaintiff contended that it
should be compensated for the highest and best use to which
the land could be readily converted, a forty-lot residential de-
velopment.' 30 The court agreed with Plaintiff and found this
use to be a physically and financially possible conversion.' 3 '
Thus, the court accepted the fair market value of a forty-lot
residential development as the value of the 12.5 acres before
the government action.' 2 After that determination, the court
accepted that the value of the property to be $2,658,000
before the permit denial.'33
Prior to entering a discussion of the value after the gov-
ernment action, the Loveladies IV court first entered a discus-
sion of who bears the burden of proof.3 The government
claimed that Plaintiff failed to show that certain alternative
uses were impossible. The court rejected that contention.'13
The government's series of proposed alternatives - hunt-
ing, fishing, aquaculture, a mitigation site, or a marina - were
found to be unsupported by any reasonable amount of evi-
dence.'13 The court ascertained that these uses were put forth
on the reliance that a plaintiff in a takings claim has the bur-
den to disprove that such uses were not possible,' 1 but this is
not a burden for the plaintiff to bear. The only use accepted
by the court for after-denial valuation was that put forth by
the plaintiff: conservation and recreation.'3 8 This use gave the
property a value of approximately $1,000.00 per acre for a to-
tal value of $12,500 for the entire 12.5 acres.' 9
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 157-58. The court establishes the plaintiff's burden as one of persua-
sion. It is the plaintiff's responsibility to persuade the court that it is more likely than
not that there remains no economically viable use in its property. Id.
135. Id. at 159.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 158.
138. Id.
139; Id.
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The court closes the case by stating that with the simple
application of logic and good judgment to the matter, it is ob-
vious that a substantial reduction from $2,658,000 to $12,500
forms a proper basis for finding that there has been a
taking. 40
IV. Analysis
The Loveladies Harbor decision is a takings decision
which skirts important issues in favor of clinging inflexibly to
concepts of a generic takings analysis. The Claims Court takes
a severe stance in this case in favor of the landowner. Each
issue in Loveladies Harbor was supported by case law favor-
ing the government's position. 4' However, the court went out
of its way to avoid these cases and the arguments they
espoused.
A. Parcel as a Whole
The fact that the plaintiff loses considerable value in 12.5
acres of land is only significant if one ignores the fact that the
plaintiff has made substantial profits from selling every other
segment of the original purchase. The 12.5 acres was a part of
the original 250 acre parcel purchased by the plaintiff. It was
not a separate purchase and was not distinct from the original
250 acres. This 12.5 acres was not a separate piece of land, but
a part of a whole.
When deciding what constitutes the parcel as a whole, the
Claims Court sets aside its own decision",2 in Deltona Corp. v.
United States,' 43 which looked at the original parcel and com-
pared it to the value of what was left after the government
action.' 4 This comparison was made despite the fact that the
developer, Deltona Corp., already sold a large portion of the
original parcel. While it is true that the Deltona court's com-
parison of the original purchase to what was left after the gov-
140. Id. at 160(citing Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 65 (1979)).
141. See supra note 119 and accompanying text.
142. Loveladies IMb, 15 Cl. Ct. at 388.
143. 657 F.2d 1184 (1981).
144. Id. at 1192.
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ernment action was one of a few considerations, 145 it was a
consideration nonetheless. The Loveladies Harbor court
backed its decision to ignore Deltona by claiming it does not
want to be tied to a rigid rule requiring it to consider the orig-
inal purchase."4 6 It then turns around and adopts a more rigid
rule, which considers only the value of the property which is
left after the government action.'4 7 The court failed to recog-
nize that the Deltona decision did not choose one factor over
another, but rather considered all of them together.'48
The Loveladies Harbor court cited Keystone Bituminous
Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictus' 9 in order for the court to infer
that the extent and the use of the original purchase is not a
consideration. In Keystone the Supreme Court looked only at
the value of the property which was still in the hands of the
claimant at the time of the alleged taking. Using this decision
to bolster its conclusion to disregard the original purchase ig-
nores the fact that it was unnecessary for the Keystone court
to even consider the value of the original parcel or the benefits
already derived from the original purchase. The Keystone
court found that sufficient value was left in the property after
the alleged taking and dismissed the plaintiff's claim. Because
the Keystone court found that there was sufficient use re-
maining in the property, the purchase price was not an issue.
Besides being unnecessary, the facts in Keystone made con-
sideration of the entire purchase price too difficult.' 5 How-
145. Id. at 1192-94.
146. Loveladies IlIb, 15 Cl. Ct. at 392.
147. Id.
148. Deltona at 1192-94. The irony of this decision to ignore the property which
had already been developed is the Claims Court decision in Ciampitti v. United
States, 22 Cl. Ct. 310 (1991), where the Claims Court puts into the "parcel-as-a-
whole" equation "not only those areas as to which dredge and fill permits were de-
nied, but also those areas that had been successfully developed earlier." Ciampitti, 22
Cl. Ct. at 320. The Ciampitti court specifically adopts the Deltona decision in making
this consideration. Id. at 319-20.
149. 480 U.S. 470, 471 (1986).
150. Keystone dealt with a statute that affected huge underground tracts of coal
which were purchased, not all at one time, but on many separate occasions over a
period of thirty years, from 1890 to 1920. 480 U.S. at 470. It would be a difficult and
cumbersome task to find out exactly what profits were obtained in the years prior to
the government action when there is no specific starting point as to the original
1992]
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ever, in a situation where there has been a purchase of an eas-
ily definable piece of property, and the entire property is
meant to be used for one purpose - to improve, develop, and
sell - the court should not be so quick to ignore the fact that
80% of the original purchase has been used to fulfill that
purpose.
If the Penn Central anti-segmentation rule1 51 is applied
to the facts in Loveladies Harbor, there is then another possi-
ble inference. While the anti-segmentation rule requires the
courts to avoid dividing a single parcel into discrete segments
in order to determine if the rights in one such segment have
been abrogated, fairness should require preventing the land-
owner from doing the same segmentation prior to bringing an
action. An illustration may make the point a little clearer:
A developer purchases a large parcel of land which con-
tains within its boundaries a certain amount of environmen-
tally sensitive wetlands. The developer proceeds to improve
and sell those segments which are not part of the wetlands,
leaving only the segment of the original purchase which is
wetlands. In such a case, the developer itself has divided a
single parcel into discrete segments and now awaits for either
the Corps or the courts to determine the developer's rights in
the one segment that consists of wetlands. Under the Lovela-
dies Harbor decision, none of these facts would be considered
and the government would be forced to either allow the wet-
lands to be filled or pay full market value as if it were
purchasing developed property.152
The hypothetical above is not meant to assume any kind
of devious planning on the part of developers. What it is
meant to point out is that many land owners who find them-
selves in possession of wetlands which impede development
plans will no longer be required to sell the land if the wet-
lands are important enough to preserve. These wetland own-
ers can now get the government to purchase the land and still
realize a profit without making the improvements; none of
purchase.
151. See supra text accompanying notes 33-35.
152. Loveladies IV, 21 C1. Ct. 153 (1990).
[Vol. 9
24https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol9/iss2/10
PRIVATELY OWNED WETLANDS
this interfering with the profits derived from the other seg-
ments of the original purchase.
B. Economic Viability
As the Loveladies Harbor court noted, eminent domain
proceedings allow the property to be valued for its present use
or for that use for which the property is readily convertible.
The court adopted the latter valuation.'53 While it appears
that the court had the discretion to choose its valuation
method, it is a choice which ignores the fact that the govern-
ment has not attempted to interfere with any of the funda-
mental rights in the property. The government action is only
meant to restrict certain uses, and it does not interfere with
the fundamental rights to possess, dispose of, and exclude
others from the property.154 By choosing the "readily convert-
ible" method of valuation, the Claims Court has recognized
the "right to develop" as a fundamental right in property.
The court has weighed investment-backed expectations to de-
velop the wetland heavily in favor of the plaintiff. Once the
court decided to put that much emphasis on what Plaintiff
wanted to use the land for, it was just a matter of simple math
for the court to find that the economic impact was severe
enough to find a taking had occurred. 155
Looking to the Penn Central case, the Supreme Court
used the approach which considers the current use at the time
of the alleged taking, as opposed to the readily convertible
use. The Loveladies Harbor court should have adopted this
approach and recognized the current use of the property
which is its natural use as a wetland. By recognizing the cur-
rent use instead of the potential use, the permit denial does
not interfere with any inherent rights which come with such a
use. ' There is case law which supports such a position. 51
153. See supra note 131 and accompanying text.
154. The Claims Court conceded that all or most of the fundamental rights in
property were left intact. 15 Cl. Ct. at 391.
155. See supra notes 130-142 and accompanying text.
156. See David B. Hunter, An Ecological Perspective on Property: A Call for
Judicial Protection of the Public's Interest In Environmentally Critical Resources,
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The purpose of compensation for taking property should
be to replace what has been taken away, or at least provide
some functional equivalent to what has been taken. By choos-
ing a form of compensation which provides a functional
equivalent (in this case, money) to the fair market value of a
forty-lot residential development, the court is in effect stating
that the government has taken the forty-lot development
away from the plaintiff when in fact there is no forty-lot de-
velopment present on the property. By using this approach,
the court appears to further establish a fundamental right to
develop.
Even Justice Holmes recognized that there is no reason to
give the purchaser greater rights than he bought. 58 The plain-
tiff in this case bought no more than the rights to possess,
dispose of, and exclude others from 12.5 acres of wetland. 59
Its goal of improving and developing the property was just
that, a goal; it is not a right.160
Even accepting that the property was purchased with the
expectation that it could be developed, it does not follow that
the purchaser should be compensated for the expectation. An
investment-backed expectation might be a proper considera-
tion for determining takings, however it should not be a valu-
ation tool, especially if the expectation is one that may cause
significant harm to a resource vital to the public health,
safety, and welfare. This demonstrates one of the major
problems with Loveladies Harbor; the court fails to recognize
12 HARV. ENVTL. L. R. 311, 329 (1988).
157. Sibson v. State, 115 N.H. 124, 336 A.2d 239 (1975) (owner has no absolute
and unlimited right to change the essential character of his land so as to use it for a
purpose for which it is unsuited. in its natural state); see also Just v. Marinette
County, 56 Wis.2d 7, 291 N.W.2d 761 (1972).
158. Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 416 (1922)("[W]e cannot see
that the fact.their risk has become a danger warrants the giving to them greater
rights than they bought"). Id.
159. The court refutes this argument by once again clinging to the Federal Cir-
cuit decision in Florida Rock. In Florida Rock the court considered laughable the
government's proposal that the best possible use in the land was as a wetland and
should be evaluated as such before the permit denial. Florida Rock Industries v.
United States, 791 F.2d 893 (Fed. Ct. 1986).
160. See supra note 156'
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the importance of wetlands to the health, safety, and welfare
of the public, which is due, in large part, to decision in Flor-
ida Rock Industries v. United States.16'
C. Character of the Government Action
A significant problem with the Loveladies Harbor court is
its adherence to a "wooden" rule adopted from the Florida
Rock decision.1 2 Florida Rock purports that protection of a
wetland is a promotion of a public benefit as opposed to a
prevention of a serious harm. The Claims Court recognized
that some may consider the protection of a wetland also pre-
vention of a harm, but the court likened the fact situation in
Loveladies Harbor to that of Florida Rock and therefore
adopted Florida Rock's position that the permit denial pro-
motes a public good for which the public should bear the bur-
den. The Loveladies Harbor court failed to recognize the sig-
nificant factual differences between Florida Rock and
Loveladies Harbor.
The plaintiff in Florida Rock purchased property in order
to mine the limestone. While this activity is intrusive, it is
only temporary. Upon using all the minable limestone, the
plaintiff would discontinue the operation. The pro forma pol-
lution caused by this mining activity would be abated after a
three year period. 6 ' The development plans of the plaintiff in
Loveladies Harbor are not temporary in nature; the plaintiff
wants to permanently fill 12.5 acres of wetlands in order put
in residential housing."" It may be assumed that the in-
creased traffic and pollution from such a development will put
added permanent stress on the surrounding wetlands, not to
mention the fact that 12.5 acres would be permanently lost.
The permanency of the situation should be a significant
factual difference when determinirig whether the activity pre-
vented poses a public threat which should be prevented
through a permit denial without having to compensate the
161. 791 F.2d 893 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
162. See Blumm & Zaleha, note 62, at 756.
163. Florida Rock, 791 F.2d at 896.
164. See supra notes 78-83 and accompanying text.
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owner. A temporary disturbance .on significant wetland prop-
erty may not be a significant public harm which requires gov-
ernment action in order to prevent it. However, when the ac-
tivity on the wetland is permanent and severe, the
government should be allowed to prevent such activity with-
out having to compensate the actor.
Another significant difference between Florida Rock and
Loveladies Harbor is the fact that of the original purchases
made in both cases, Loveladies Harbor was able to make use
of 80% of its purchase, while Florida Rock Industries is not
able to use one of the 1,560 acres purchased for their original
purpose. 16 5 However, the Loveladies Harbor court will not rec-
ognize this difference because it will not consider the original
property in its taking determination.' 6
The root problem with the outcome of Loveladies Har-
bor, and Florida Rock for that matter, is the failure of the
Claims Court to recognize the importance of wetlands to the
prevention of serious harm to the environment. It is necessary
for the courts to recognize that protection of the environment
is a prevention of serious harm.16 7 This is especially true with
unique resources such as coastal and fresh water wetlands.
The Loveladies Harbor court ignores widespread recognition
that wetlands prevent many serious public harms such as
165. See supra notes 102-09 and accompanying text.
166. See supra notes 107-09 and accompanying text.
167. The issue of whether environmental protection can be a prevention of pub-
lic harm has faced scrutiny by the Supreme Court. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal
Council, 112 S.Ct. 2886 (1992). Lucas involved the application of South Carolina's
Beach Front Management Act (S.C. Code Ann. § 48-39-10 et seq. (Supp. 1990)) to a
landowner who wanted to develop on a beach/dune system. As applied to the land-
owner, the Act prevented any construction of permanent structures on the beach
front property. The Supreme Court deferred judgment on the issue and remanded
Lucas to the South Carolina Supreme Court to determine if the purposes of the Act
were consistent with the State Common Law for Public Nuisances. Id. Previously, the
South Carolina Supreme Court had recognized the importance of the dune system in
preventing the destruction of life and property by serving as a storm barrier, as well
as the importance of the dunes as a habitat to numerous species of plants and ani-
mals. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 304 S.C. 376, 404 S.E.2d 895 (1991).
The court decided that preventing destruction of this unique resource was a valid
exercise of the state's power to prevent serious public harm, and therefore did not
constitute a taking. Id.
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flooding, increased shoreline erosion, and diminished ground-
water recharge.16 8 The court takes a shortcut by simply stat-
ing that the facts are similar to Florida Rock and therefore
the same conclusion is appropriate. Notwithstanding the sus-
pect conclusions in the Florida Rock case, it should not be
deemed appropriate to skirt any issue as important as the
protection of a unique natural resource in such a cursory man-
ner when each takings case rests upon its own ad hoc factual
determinations. '6 9
V. Conclusion
Loveladies Harbor must be recognized because it demon-
strates that wetlands regulation will continue to clash with
private land rights in the wake of increasing pressure to do
more to protect the environment. The Claims Court has es-
tablished precedent for itself in wetlands takings issue which
appears to favor the individual property owner.'7 0 Because the
Claims Court has jurisdiction over claims against the federal
government which exceed $10,000,17' and because most tak-
ings claims against the federal government concerning real
property will exceed $10,000, the Claims Court is likely to
hear most takings claims similar to that of Loveladies Harbor,
Inc."' It is therefore reasonable to assume that Loveladies
Harbor will have a significant effect on the regulation of wet-
lands in the future.
In order to come to a more rational rule for wetland tak-
ings claims, the courts must recognize the importance of the
168. See Blumm & Zaleha, note 62, at 757.
169. See generally Penn Central, 438 U.S. 104, 124-28 (1978) (the court identified
a few factors against what it termed an "ad hoc factual inquiry").
170. Judge Smith uses the Federal Circuit's opinion in Florida Rock to tip the
balance in favor of the private landowner against the government interest in protect-
ing wetlands. Loveladies IlIb, 15 Cl. Ct. at 394.
171. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346 and 1491 (1988).
172. While it is true that district courts as well as the Claims Court have heard
wetlands takings cases, some jurisdictions have stated that any claim above $10,000
must be heard in the Claims Court. See WANT, supra note 36 at § 10.06. It is likely
that even though some district courts would hear takings claims above $10,000 poten-
tial claimants will file in the Claims Court where a landowner can be sure of a more
sympathetic court.
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environment and wetland ecology to the public at large and
include it more extensively in a takings determination. Courts
must also recognize that wetlands are not the same as other
forms of real property. 173 A wetland is a unique resource
which has significant impacts on the health, safety and wel-
fare of the general public.
This does not mean that courts should ignore the individ-
ual land owner's rights. Courts, government regulators and en-
vironmentalists must reconcile the importance of wetland eco-
systems with the fact that 80% of wetlands are privately
owned. If the Corps is concerned about multimillion dollar
lawsuits every time it seeks to exert its permitting authority
to protect the wetlands, the economic and environmental
costs will be excessive. However, private landowners and their
investment of time and money cannot be overlooked, because
their economic losses are not insignificant.
173. See Hunter, supra note 156 at 337 (different ecotypes of land deserve differ-
ent treatment under the laws).
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